Read a link before you click it: decodes punycode, spots the @ trick, mixed-script homographs and brand-in-subdomain. The link is read, never fetched.
Checking the address bar is the advice everyone gives, and there is a trick built into URLs that defeats it completely. In https://www.paypal.com@secure-verify.example/ the part that reads as PayPal is a username, and the browser goes to secure-verify.example. The Suspicious URL Analyzer takes a link apart and names what it actually resolves to, along with the other deceptions that live in the address itself.
Punycode is the other half of the problem. Browsers show xn--pypal-4ve rather than what it decodes to, because what it decodes to is pаypal with a Cyrillic а that is drawn identically to a Latin a. The tool decodes every label and flags any single word drawing on two alphabets at once.
Nothing is fetched and nothing is uploaded; the link is only read. That is a genuine limit as much as a privacy property, and the page says so rather than implying a verdict it cannot give.
Load Sample opens on https://www.paypal.com@secure-verify.example/account/login. The summary answers the only question that matters first — it really goes to secure-verify.example — and the misleading half is listed underneath as decoration, struck through, because that is exactly its role. Below that sits one finding marked high, explaining that everything between the scheme and the @ is credentials rather than a destination. Cycle the sample and you get a punycode homograph, a bare IP on plain http, a link with paypal.com buried in a subdomain of account-security.example, and finally an ordinary address that produces no findings at all.
xn-- label is decoded with the RFC 3492 bootstring algorithm, per label rather than across the whole host, since münchen.example encodes as xn--mnchen-3ya.example and not as one blob. The decoder was checked against Node’s own url.domainToUnicode on six hosts and agreed on all six.münchen is one script and passes cleanly; pаypal is two and does not. A tool that flagged every non-ASCII domain would be useless in most of the world.paypal.com.account-security.example the registrable domain is the last two labels, and everything left of them is chosen freely by whoever owns it. Reading left to right stops at the first familiar word, which is what that shape exploits..zip and .mov earn extra caution for also being file extensions.These are heuristics read off the address, and that is the whole method. There is no reputation database here, no Safe Browsing lookup, and the page is never fetched, so a brand-new phishing site with an ordinary-looking name passes every check above. Treat a clean result as one reason to relax and never as permission to enter a password.